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IFR-THE LIABILITY OF THE AIRFRAME AND
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
GERALD C. STERNS
T HIS PAPER will discuss the potential liability of the airframe
and component part manufacturer for wrongful death, per-
sonal injuries, and property damage which are proximately caused
by a defect, malfunction, or failure of the airframe or any of the
component parts designed, manufactured, or assembled by any
vendor, and installed in the aircraft at the time of the accident. A
cause of action against either the airframe or component manu-
facturer may be based on common law theories of negligence,
breach of express or implied warranty, or upon the doctrine of
strict liability in tort.
I. DEFENDANTS
When the accident investigation produces evidence of a specific
mechanical, structural, or design defect that can be attributed to
an airframe manufacturer, the responsibility of the airframe manu-
facturer is clearly original, and that manufacturer should be joined
as a defendant. In other instances, the accident may reveal evidence
of a design defect or structural failure of a component part, such
as an engine, altimeter, or rudder cable. In that situation, the
manufacturer of that component part may bear original respon-
sibility for the defect, and should be joined in the lawsuit. How-
ever, the manufacturer of the airframe may also be held respon-
sible for defects in any of the component parts of an airplane.'
Thus, the plaintiffs in an action arising out of a component part
failure have a choice in many jurisdictions of proceeding against
the manufacturer of the defective component, the airframe manu-
18 AM. JuR. 2d Aviation § 133 (1963).
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facturer, or both. In Boeing v. Brown,' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a manufacturer who
buys and installs a component which has been manufactured by
another is subject to the same liability as though it were the com-
ponent manufacturer.
The question of whether or not the manufacturer of a product
incorporating a component part made by another has a duty to do
more than test and inspect the component varies among the juris-
dictions. There are indications that the trend is toward the rule of
full responsibility. For example, Boeing v. Brown,' held that the
airframe manufacturer has the same duty as the component manu-
facturer to exercise reasonable care in the design and construction
of the component part, as well as in testing and inspection when
it is installed.
A plaintiff proceeding on a warranty theory may find an ob-
stacle to his joinder of the component manufacturer as a defendant.
In Goldberg v. Kolsman Instrument Corp.,' a New York Court
held that an airframe manufacturer's implied warranty of fitness
ran to, and in favor of, a passenger, despite lack of contractual
privity, but the implied warranty of the manufacturer of a defective
altimeter did not. It should be noted, however, that New York law
still provides for a direct action against a manufacturer of a com-
ponent part based on a negligence theory.'
II. LIABILITY BASED ON NEGLIGENCE
There is general agreement that the manufacturer of an airframe
or a component part has the duty of ordinary and reasonable care
in the design and manufacture of his product.' This theory of
liability is well expressed in the case of Trans-World Airlines v.
Curtis Wright Corp.,' a case in which the issues centered around
the liability of an engine manufacturer for negligence in the manu-
2 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
3Id.
4 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
5Id.
68 AM. JUR. 2d Aviation § 133 (1963).
1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), afl'd without opinion, 2 App.
Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546, appeal denied, 2 App. Div. 745, 153 N.Y.S.2d
566 (1956).
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facture of the engine. The court held that the manufacturer of
articles or component parts which are inherently dangerous when
negligently made may be held directly liable to the ultimate user
for any injuries he may sustain as a result of an accident attribut-
able to a defect in the component.
The modem trend supports the maintenance of a cause of ac-
tion in negligence due to a defectively designed product. For
example, an airframe manufacturer was recently held liable for
wrongful death damages due to a negligently designed and installed
seatbelt, seat, and seat track. These defective parts combined to
cause the death of a forty-two year old man from a ruptured
mesenteric artery in an otherwise survivable accident The court
drew upon a long line of authority in the automobile field in
holding that the manufacturer's' duty of care includes construction
of a reasonably crashworthy aircraft.
III. LIABILITY BASED ON BREACH OF WARRANTY
A manufacturer of an airplane or component part may also be
held liable for damages on the theory of breach of express war-
ranty. Express warranties have been found in advertisements and
brochures designed to induct customers to purchase a particular
aircraft or component part, as well as from conversations with
sales representatives. These representations usually deal with the
safety of a particular aircraft or part and have been held to be
express warranties that may give rise to liability.
An action may also arise against an airframe or component
manufacturer on a breach of implied warranty. It has been held
that where the article is of such a character that when used for the
purpose for which it was made it is likely to be a source of danger
to many people if not properly designed and fashioned, the manu-
facturer is liable for breach of implied warranties to persons whose
use is contemplated, including automobile passengers The juris-
dictions appear to be split on whether or not privity of contract is
required to maintain such an action.
The potential benefits to a claimant of grounding a cause of
I Eichstedt v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 28,209 (2d Jud. Dist. Nev. Aug. 30,
1977).
1 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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action in a theory of warranty is that such an action eliminates
the need of establishing negligence in the design or manufacturing
process. In wrongful death cases, however, a minority of states
do not consider a breach of warranty to be a "wrong" under their
wrongful death statutes.
A representative case involving breach of warranty is Goldberg
v. Kolsman Instrument Corp.,'" which concerned a defective al-
timeter. The court held that the manufacturer of the airframe had
made an implied warranty of fitness for intended use which ran
in favor of all intended users. As noted above, however, the court
refused to hold the component manufacturer responsible to an
injured passenger on an implied warranty theory.
IV. STRICT LIABILITY
By far the most useful theory of liability for plaintiffs is the
doctrine known as strict liability in tort. By now, most jurisdictions
have adopted, at a minimum, the standard imposed by Section
402(a) of the Second Restatement of Torts." Section 402(a) was
enacted following the California Supreme Court decision of Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," which held that a manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.
The California courts have continued to develop and expand
the doctrine of strict liability in tort by enlarging the concept of
what constitutes an actionable defect. In the case of Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corporation,'" California had clearly dispensed with
Section 402(a)'s requirement that the defect be "unreasonably
dangerous" before a cause of action based on strict liability could
arise. On January 16, 1978, in the case of Barker v. Lull Engi-
neering Company, Inc.," the California Supreme Court again ex-
tended the doctrine of strict liability in tort in a decision of far
reaching implications. In the Barker case, the court was dealing
with a question of defective design, and decided "that a product is
10240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965).
1259 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
"8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
1420 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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defective in design either 1) if the product has failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used as in-
tended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, or 2) if in light of
the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged
design are outweighed by the risk of danger in such design."'"
This is a very significant expansion of the strict liability concept
because a manufacturer will now be held liable if his products fail
to satisfy reasonable consumer expectations.
A further example of the modem trend toward expanding the
concept of defect is the recent case of Rudisale v. Hawk Aviation."8
In Rudisale, the trial court held that a fixed base operator that
rented an airplane with no oil in the engine had rented a "defective
product" which gave rise to liability on a theory of strict liability
in tort, rather than negligence. The plaintiff's burden of proof in
a strict liability action is far less than his burden in a negligence
case: he must merely show that 1) he was injured while the article
was being used in an intended or foreseeable manner; 2) the injury
was the result of a defect in design or manufacture; and 3) the
plaintiff was unaware of the defect which made the article unsafe
for such use."
Recently, a few courts have held that hard landings or crashes
are "forseeable" uses of an airplane, and that strict liability may
be imposed if the aircraft is designed or manufactured so that it is
"unsafe" in a foreseeable accident. This doctrine of "crashworthi-
ness" has long been applied in the automotive field and is starting
to find acceptance in the aviation industry as well. For example,
Self v. General Motors Corporation' held that while collisions
may not be the normal or intended use of any automobile, the
fact that automobiles are frequently involved in collisions during
the course of normal use is so widely known that vehicle manu-
facturers must consider accidents to be reasonably foreseeable
occurrences, and design their products, accordingly. The parallel
to aviation is evident.
15 Id.
16 [1978] Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 17,713 (Dist. Ct. for San Juan Cty., N.M.
1977).
" Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229,
85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
1842 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
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V. PROBLEMS OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
The plaintiff in a products liability action involving both an air-
frame manufacturer and a component manufacturer must be aware
of the doctrines of contribution and indemnity. The application of
these concepts is often of great tactical significance.
Indemnity may arise by contract or implication under the com-
mon law. Under indemnity, where one party has incurred liability,
he may recover all he has been forced to pay from another person
who is found to be primarily responsible. Indemnity will usually
apply only where the party seeking reimbursement is without ac-
tive fault. As an example, a retailer, held liable in strict liability
because of a defective label on a product, might obtain indemnity
from the manufacturer-labeller.
At common law there was no right of contribution among joint
tort-feasors. Any judgment debtor could be held for the whole
amount. This is changed by statute in many states, e.g. the Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasor Act.9 Under the Act the
judgment is usually divided arithmetically by the number of tort-
feasors held, with those whose liability is derivative or vicarious,
i.e., principal and agent, being counted as one part. In some juris-
dictions both the common law rule and the strict division rule
have been replaced by a concept of "equitable contribution,"
where the respective ultimate shares of each defendant as to each
other are determined on the basis of comparative fault."
It is vital for the plaintiff practitioner to know which contribu-
tion rule is followed in the jurisdiction where the case is pending,
as many times strategy is dictated more by inter-defendant rela-
tionships than by the strength of the plaintiff's case. Care must
also be taken in determining how many "sides" or sets of de-
fendants there really are. A jurisdiction may permit the compara-
tive responsibility among defendants to be determined in the main
action," and if the plaintiff has not joined other potentially respon-
sible parties, they may be joined in the original proceeding by the
defendant(s). The defense, therefore, in a very real sense, can dic-
tate the parties in the plaintiff's case.
'9 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT. 57 (1975).
20See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975).
21 American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578 (1978).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In all aviation accidents where pilot error is not the clear cause
of the accident, responsible counsel must examine the potential
liability of the airframe and component manufacturers. Thorough
and complete preparation prior to filing is urged, to avoid the
dragnet effect of filing against the airframe and component manu-
facturers needlessly. Plaintiffs have available a formidable arsenal
of weapons, including the doctrines of negligence, warranty, and
strict liability, as recently expanded by Barker," but defendants
have recently been provided with a long needed shield in the doc-
trine of comparative fault among defendants.
22 Barker v. Lull Engineering Company, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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